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People's Liberation Army Reserve Force

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People's Liberation Army Reserve Force
中国人民解放军预备役部队
中国人民解放军军旗
Active1955-1957
1983 -- present
Country People's Republic of China
Allegiance Chinese Communist Party
Branch People's Liberation Army
TypeReserve force
Role补充正规军力量、地面作战、边海防
Size510,000 [1]
Part ofCentral Military Commission
Garrison/HQBeijing
Commanders
Director of the National Defense Mobilization DepartmentPLAGF Lt Gen Liu Faqing (刘发庆)
Political Commissar of the NDMDPLAGF Lt Gen Wang Donghai (王东海)
Insignia
Cap badge
Shoulder badge

The Reserve Force of the People's Liberation Army is the military reserve force of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). It is composed of a trained force of (mostly retired veteran) civilians that retain an inactive military status, and are subject to fast mobilization.[2] in case of wartime or other crises, at which time they are transferred to active duty and their units activated into full service.

The reserve forces are organized as full units with a small number of active servicemen as an organizational skeleton, plus a larger body of reserve officers and soldiers in call-up ready state. Reserve units follow the unified organization of the PLA and are entered into the official PLA TOEs and order of battle. The PLA reserve forces are directly under the leadership of the Central Military Commission (CMC).[3] The National Defense Mobilization Department of the CMC manages the recruitment, unit assignment and mobilization structures.

History[edit]

The reserve force of the People's Liberation Army of China was originally established with the formalization of the PLA structures in 1955, but was soon abolished in 1957.[4] At the time, the concept of people's war essentially made the Militia into a de facto reserve force, and former PLA servicemen entered the militia as "cadre militia" when demobilized.[citation needed]

In 1983, the CMC decided to restore a formal PLA reserve force and officially named it the "People's Liberation Army Reserve Force". In May 1984, the reserve force was included in the Military Service Law of the People's Republic of China. Initially, the reserve force was solely infantry units. After the 1990s, it developed into infantry, artillery, armor, engineering, communications, chemical defense and other services.[4] When the People's Liberation Army Reserve Forces were first established, they were under the dual leadership of the military on the one hand, and the local Chinese Communist Party (CCP) committees and local People's Governments on the other. On 10 August 10, 1986, the reserve force was included in the organizational order of battle of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, and the division and regiment-level units of the reserve force were awarded designations and military flags.[5]

As part of the 2015 People's Republic of China military reform, from 1 July 2020, the reserve force began to be readjusted from dual military and civilian leadership to CMC leadership.[3][6]

A new Reservist Law[7] passed in 2022, and entered into effect on 1 March 2023. It eliminated the dual authority system, and for the first time excluded the Militia from the formal reserve force.[8] The new law established a formal system of "selection, training, appointment, management, recruitment and retirement", with an explicit intent of recruiting and retaining a wider range of talents and specialists.[9]

Structure of the Reserve Force[edit]

Organization and control[edit]

The Reservists Law gives the Central Committee of the CCP and the Central Military Commission full and exclusive authority over the Reserve Force, with every department of the CMC having different obligations. The most central of those offices is the National Defense Mobilization Department, which is responsible for assigning reservists to units, and for calling them up when needed.[citation needed]

Reserve Service[edit]

Reservists are by law[10] a distinct form of military service status, and the individual reservist status is distinct and independent from belonging to any reserve forces' formation. Before the new revised Military Service Law took effect on October 1, 2021, reserve personnel included four forms: pre-assignment to active forces, incorporation into reserve forces, incorporation into militia organizations for reserve service, and other forms of reserve service, a very wide definition. The new Reserve Service Law of 2022 define reservists exclusively to PRC citizens 18 and older who are "preassigned" to active duty units or are assigned to reserve units. That means that only those pre-registered, with a predetermined obligation to join a specific unit when mobilized, are classified as reserve personnel, thus excluding the militia.[11]

The law also specified that reservists include both enlisted and officers, specifying that reserve officers can only be of company or field grade. There are no reserve general officers, meaning that the higher leadership of reserve units has to be active service assigned to the skeletal units.[citation needed]

Selection and Recruitment[edit]

Before the 2022 reforms, reserve officers were mainly selected from qualified veterans, local cadres, people's armed cadres, militia cadres, and technical personnel with local and military occupations. Reserve troops generally conducted 240 hours of military and political training every year.[4] The new law indicates that the PLA will recruit reservists mainly from former PLA active duty personnel, and from professional and technical personnel that "meet the conditions for reserve service and have registered for reserve service."[7] This last clause allowing the possibility of non-veteran specialist reservists. It is also to be noted that entering the reserves is not automatic for soldiers ending their military service. The minimum term of the reserve service shall be four years.[citation needed]

Benefits for reservists[edit]

One of the main goals of the reforms was to improve the attractiveness of reserve duty. The new law clarified financial aid for training costs, and clarifies that reservists participating in training of active duty shall have the same medical insurance, benefits, and compensation as active duty member.[citation needed]

Reservist ranks and retirement[edit]

The law specifies the ranks and mandatory retirement ages for reserve officers and enlisted personnel, with age of retirement increasing with rank.

Ranks and Retirement Ages of Reserve Officers[12]
Reserve Grades Reserve Ranks Mandatory Retirement Age
Reserve Field Grade Officers Reserve Senior Colonel 60
Reserve Colonel
Reserve Lieutenant Colonel
Reserve Major
Reserve Company Grade Officers Reserve Captain Command track officers: 45

Technical track officers: 50

Reserve Lieutenant
Reserve Second Lieutenant
Ranks and Retirement Ages of Reserve NCOs and Junior Enlisted[12]
Reserve Grades Reserve Ranks Mandatory Retirement Age
Reserve Senior Grade NCOs Reserve Master Sergeant Class One 55
Reserve Master Sergeant Class Two
Reserve Master Sergeant Class Three
Reserve Intermediate Grade NCOs Reserve Sergeant First Class
Reserve Sergeant Second Class 45
Reserve Junior Grade NCOs Reserve Sergeant
Reserve Corporal
Reserve Junior Enlisted Reserve Private First Class 30
Reserve Private

Reserve Force Formations[edit]

The approximately 550,000 reservists of the PLA Reserve Force are assigned to units that are maintained in peacetime as skeletal organizations with a standing active service staff. The organization of these Reserve Force units is in flux. It is unclear, for instance, if the Reserve Forces will be fully "brigadized" like the regular PLA forces. As of 2023, they included at least the following, but the changes in structure of the Reserve Force are ongoing, and the TOEs change extremely fast.[13]

Maneuver Units[edit]

  • 18 infantry divisions
  • 4 infantry brigades
  • 3 independent infantry regiments
  • 2 armored regiments

Combat Support Units[edit]

  • 3 artillery divisions
  • 7 artillery brigades
  • 15 Engineering regiments
  • 1 pontoon bridge brigade
  • 3 pontoon bridge regiments
  • 10 chemical defense regiments
  • 10 signals regiments

Combat Service Support Units[edit]

  • 9 logistics brigades
  • 1 logistics regiment

Air Defense Units[edit]

  • 17 Air defense divisions
  • 8 Air defense brigades
  • 8 Air defense regiments

References[edit]

  1. ^ IMR Reporter (15 March 2023). "PLA Reserves, Paramilitary Forces and Capabilities, Recent Developments in 2021-22". Indian Military Review. Archived from the original on 6 June 2024. Retrieved 6 June 2024.
  2. ^ "第一支预备役部队:英姿勃发的国防新军". 新華社. Archived from the original on 2020-11-04. Retrieved 2020-07-01.
  3. ^ a b "中共中央印发 《关于调整预备役部队领导体制的决定》". 新華社. Archived from the original on 2020-09-19. Retrieved 2020-07-01.
  4. ^ a b c "什么是中国人民解放军预备役部队?". 中國網. Archived from the original on 2020-11-04. Retrieved 2020-07-01.
  5. ^ "我军预备役部队穿什么军服,你了解多少? - 中华人民共和国国防部". www.mod.gov.cn. Archived from the original on 2024-06-06. Retrieved 2024-06-06.
  6. ^ "China to adjust leadership structure for reserve forces - China Military". eng.chinamil.com.cn. Archived from the original on 2023-12-06. Retrieved 2024-06-06.
  7. ^ a b "中华人民共和国预备役人员法 - 中华人民共和国国防部". www.mod.gov.cn. Archived from the original on 2024-06-06. Retrieved 2024-06-04.
  8. ^ "- 解放军报 - 中国军网". www.81.cn. Archived from the original on 2024-06-06. Retrieved 2024-06-06.
  9. ^ "Reservists Law important for national defense and military development: Defense spokesperson - Ministry of National Defense". eng.mod.gov.cn. Archived from the original on 2023-03-16. Retrieved 2024-06-04.
  10. ^ 中华人民共和国第十三届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第 三十八次 (2022-12-30). "中华人民共和国预备役" (PDF). NPC Observer. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2024-06-06. Retrieved 2024-06-04.
  11. ^ 解放军报 (2021-08-26). "新时代兵役工作的法治保障——军委国防动员部主要负责同志就新修订的《中华人民共和国兵役法》答记者问". 中国人大网. Archived from the original on 2022-01-20. Retrieved 2021-09-08.
  12. ^ a b "PLA Update, Issue 8, March 23, 2023". www.cna.org. Archived from the original on 2024-05-30. Retrieved 2024-06-04.
  13. ^ For Strategic Studies (Iiss), The International Institute (2024-02-13). The Military Balance 2024. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies. p. 255. doi:10.4324/9781003485834. ISBN 978-1-003-48583-4.